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Mechanism Design for Fair Division:
Allocating Divisible Items without Payments
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We revisit the classic problem of fair division from a mechanism design perspective, using Proportional
Fairness as a benchmark. In particular, we aim to allocate a collection of divisible items to a set of agents
while incentivizing the agents to be truthful in reporting their valuations. For the very large class of homo-
geneous valuations, we design a truthful mechanism that provides every agent with at least a 1/e ≈ 0.368
fraction of her Proportionally Fair valuation. To complement this result, we show that no truthful mecha-
nism can guarantee more than a 0.5 fraction, even for the restricted class of additive linear valuations. We
also propose another mechanism for additive linear valuations that works really well when every item is
highly demanded. To guarantee truthfulness, our mechanisms discard a carefully chosen fraction of the al-
located resources; we conclude by uncovering interesting connections between our mechanisms and known
mechanisms that use money instead.
Additional Key Words and Phrases: Proportional Fairness, Mechanism Design, Fair Division, Competitive
Equilibrium from Equal Incomes
1. INTRODUCTION
From inheritance and land dispute resolution to treaty negotiations and divorce set-
tlements, the problem of fair division of diverse resources has troubled man since an-
tiquity. Not surprisingly, it has now also found its way into the highly automated,
large scale world of computing. As the leading internet companies guide the paradigm
shift into cloud computing, more and more services that used to be run on isolated
machines are being migrated to shared computing clusters. Moreover, instead of just
human beings bargaining or negotiating, one now also finds programmed strategic
agents seeking resources. The goal of the resulting multiagent resource allocation
problems [Chevaleyre et al. 2006] is to find solutions that are fair to the agents without
introducing unnecessary inefficiencies.
One of the most challenging facets of this change is the need for higher quality
incentive design in the form of protocols or mechanisms. As the peer-to-peer revolution
has taught us, a proper set of incentives can make or break a system as the number
of agents grows [Nisan et al. 2007, Chapter 23]. We therefore revisit this classic fair
division problem from a purely mechanism design approach, aiming to create simple
and efficient mechanisms that are not susceptible to strategic manipulation by the
participating agents; in particular, we want to design truthful mechanisms for fair
division of heterogeneous goods.
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One distinguishing property of resource allocation protocols in computing is that,
more often than not, they need to eschew monetary transfers completely. This is so
because, for instance, agents could represent internal teams in an internet company
which are competing for resources. This, of course, severely limits what the mechanism
designer can achieve since the collection of payments is the most versatile method
for designing truthful mechanisms. In light of this, essentially the only tool left for
aligning the agents’ incentives with the objectives of the system is what Hartline and
Roughgarden referred to as “money burning” [Hartline and Roughgarden 2008]. That
is, the system can choose to intentionally degrade the quality of its services (in our
case this will mean discarding resources) in order to influence the preferences of the
agents. This degradation of service can often be interpreted as an implicit form of
“payment”, but since these payments do not correspond to actual trades, they are es-
sentially burned or used for other purposes.
But even before dealing with the fact that the participating agents may behave
strategically, one first needs to ask what is the right objective for fairness. This ques-
tion alone has been the subject of long debates, in both social science and game theory,
leading to a very rich literature. At the time of writing this paper, there are five aca-
demic books [Young 1995; Brams and Taylor 1996; Robertson and Webb 1998; Moulin
2003; Barbanel 2004] written on the topic of fair division, providing an overview of
various proposed solutions for fairness. In this paper we will be focusing on resources
that are divisible; for such settings, the most attractive solution for efficient and fair
allocation is the Proportionally Fair solution (PF). In brief, a PF allocation is a Pareto
optimal allocation x∗ which compares favorably to any other Pareto optimal allocation
x in the sense that, when switching from x to x∗, the aggregate percentage gain in
happiness of the agents outweighs the aggregate percentage loss. The notion of PF
was first introduced in the seminal work of Kelly [1997] in the context of TCP con-
gestion control. Since then it has become the de facto solution for bandwidth sharing
in the networking community, and is in fact the most widely implemented solution
in practice (for instance see [Andrews et al. 2005])1. The wide adoption of PF as the
solution for fairness is not a fluke, but is grounded in the fact that PF is equivalent
to the Nash bargaining solution [Nash 1950], and to the Competitive Equilibria with
Equal Incomes (CEEI) [Hylland and Zeckhauser 1979; Varian 1974; Eisenberg 1961]
for a large class of valuation functions. Both Nash bargaining and the CEEI are well
regarded solutions in microeconomics for bargaining and fairness.
A notable property of the PF solution is that it gives a good tradeoff between fairness
and efficiency. One extreme notion of fairness is the Rawlsian notion of the egalitarian
social welfare that aims to maximize the quality of service of the least satisfied agent
irrespective of how much inefficiency this might be causing. On the other extreme,
the utilitarian social welfare approach aims to maximize efficiency while disregarding
how unsatisfied some agents might become. The PF allocation lies between these two
extremes by providing a significant fairness guarantee without neglecting efficiency.
As we showed in a recent work [Cole et al. 2013], for instances with just two players
who have affine valuation functions the PF allocation has a social welfare of at least
0.933 times the optimal one.
Unfortunately, the PF allocation has one significant drawback: it cannot be imple-
mented using truthful mechanisms without the use of payments; even for simple in-
stances involving just two agents and two items, it is not difficult to show that no
truthful mechanism can obtain a PF solution. This motivates the following natural
1We note that some of the earlier work on Proportional Fairness such as [Kelly 1997] and [Kelly et al. 1998]
have 2000+ and 3900+ citations respectively in Google Scholar, indicating the importance and usage of this
solution.
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question: can one design truthful mechanisms that yield a good approximation to the
PF solution? Since our goal is to obtain a fair division, we seek a strong notion of
approximation in which every agent gets a good approximation of her PF valuation.
One of our main results is to give a truthful mechanism which guarantees that every
agent will receive at least a 1/e fraction of her PF valuation for a very large class of
valuation functions. We note that this is one of the very few positive results in multi-
dimensional mechanism design without payments. We demonstrate the hardness of
achieving such truthful approximations by providing an almost matching negative re-
sult for a restricted class of valuations.
While a 1/e approximation factor is quite surprising for such a general setting, in
some circumstances one would prefer to restrict the setting in order to achieve a ratio
much closer to 1. Our final result concerns such a scenario, which is motivated by the
real-world privatization auctions that took place in Czechoslovakia in the early 90s.
At that time, the Czech government sought to privatize the state owned firms dating
from the then recently ended communist era. The government’s goal was two-fold —
first, to distribute shares of these companies to their citizens in a fair manner, and
second, to calculate the market prices of these companies so that the shares could be
traded in the open market after the initial allocation. To this end, they ran an auction,
as described in [Aggarwal and Harper 2000]. Citizens could choose to participate by
buying 1000 vouchers at a cost of 1,000 Czech Crowns, about $35, a fifth of the aver-
age monthly salary. Over 90% of those eligible participated. These vouchers were then
used to bid for shares in the available 1,491 firms. We believe that the PF allocation
provides a very appropriate solution for this example, both to calculate a fair allocation
and to compute market prices. Our second mechanism solves the problem of finding al-
locations very close to the PF allocation in a truthful fashion for such natural scenarios
where there is high demand for each resource.
1.1. Our results
In this work we provide some surprising positive results for the problem of multi-
dimensional mechanism design without payments. We focus on allocating divisible
items and we use the widely accepted solution of proportional fairness as the bench-
mark regarding the valuation that each participating player deserves. In this setting,
we undertake the design of truthful mechanisms that approximate this solution; we
consider a strong notion of approximation, requiring that every player receives a good
fraction of the valuation that she deserves according to the proportionally fair solution
of the instance at hand.
Themain contribution of this paper is the Partial Allocationmechanism. In Section 3
we analyze this mechanism and we prove that it is truthful and that it guarantees
that every player will receive at least a 1/e fraction of her proportionally fair valu-
ation. These results hold for the very general class of instances with players having
arbitrary homogeneous valuation functions of degree one. This includes a wide range
of well studied valuation functions, from additive linear and Leontief, to Constant
Elasticity of Substitution and Cobb-Douglas [Mas-Colell et al. 1995]. We later show
that for the cases of additive linear and Leontief valuation functions the outcomes of
this mechanism satisfy envy-freeness. Also, we extend both the approximation and the
truthfulness guarantees to instances with homogeneous valuations of any degree. To
complement these positive results, we provide a negative result showing that no truth-
ful mechanism can guarantee to every player an allocation with value greater than 0.5
of the value of the PF allocation, even if the mechanism is restricted to the class of
additive linear valuations.
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In Section 4 we show that restricting the set of possible instances to ones involving
players with additive linear valuations2 and items with high prices in the competitive
equilibrium from equal incomes3 will actually enable the design of even more efficient
and useful mechanisms. We present the Strong Demand Matching (SDM) mechanism,
a truthful mechanism that performs increasingly well as the competitive equilibrium
prices increase. More specifically, if p∗j is the price of item j, then the approximation
factor guaranteed by this mechanism is equal tominj
(
p∗j/
⌈
p∗j
⌉)
. It is interesting to note
that scenarios such as the privatization auction mentioned above involve a number of
bidders much larger than the number of items; as a rule, we expect this to lead to high
prices and a very good approximation of the participants’ PF valuations.
Finally, in Section 5 we provide interesting connections between the two mecha-
nisms that we propose and well known mechanisms that use monetary payments.
Specifically, we reveal a connection between the amount of resources being discarded
and monetary payments. In a nutshell, multiplicative reductions in the bidders’ fi-
nal allocations turn out to have an effect which is analogous to monetary payments.
As a result, we anticipate that this approach may have a significant impact on other
problems in mechanism design without money. Indeed, we have already applied this
approach to the problem of maximizing social welfare without payments for which a
special two-agent version of the Partial Allocation mechanism allowed us to improve
upon a setting for which mostly negative results were known [Cole et al. 2013].
1.2. Related Work
Our setting is closely related to the large topic of fair division or cake-cutting [Young
1995; Brams and Taylor 1996; Robertson and Webb 1998; Moulin 2003; Barbanel
2004], which has been studied since the 1940’s, using the [0, 1] interval as the stan-
dard representation of a cake. Each agent’s preferences take the form of a valuation
function over this interval, and then the valuations of unions of subintervals are ad-
ditive. Note that the class of homogeneous valuation functions of degree one takes us
beyond this standard cake-cutting model. Leontief valuations for example, allow for
complementarities in the valuations, and then the valuations of unions of subinter-
vals need not be additive. On the other hand, the additive linear valuations setting
that we focus on in Section 4 is very closely related to cake-cutting with piecewise
constant valuation functions over the [0, 1] interval. Other common notions of fairness
that have been studied in this literature are, proportionality4, envy-freeness, and equi-
tability [Young 1995; Brams and Taylor 1996; Robertson and Webb 1998; Moulin 2003;
Barbanel 2004].
Despite the extensive work on fair resource allocation, truthfulness considerations
have not played a major role in this literature. Most results related to truthfulness
were weakened by the assumption that each agent would be truthful in reporting her
valuations unless this strategy was dominated. Very recent work [Chen et al. 2010;
Mossel and Tamuz 2010; Zivan et al. 2010; Maya and Nisan 2012] studies truthful
cake cutting variations using the standard notion of truthfulness according to which
an agent need not be truthful unless doing so is a dominant strategy. Chen et al.
[2010] study truthful cake-cutting with agents having piecewise uniform valuations
and they provide a polynomial-time mechanism that is truthful, proportional, and
2Note that our negative results imply that the restriction to additive linear valuations alone would not be
enough to enable significantly better approximation factors.
3The prices induced by the market equilibrium when all bidders have a unit of scrip money; also referred to
as PF prices.
4It is worth distinguishing the notion of PF from that of proportionality by noting that the latter is a much
weaker notion, directly implied by the former.
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envy-free. They also design randomized mechanisms for more general families of val-
uation functions, while Mossel and Tamuz [2010] prove the existence of truthful (in
expectation) mechanisms satisfying proportionality in expectation for general valua-
tions. Zivan et al. [2010] aim to achieve envy-free Pareto optimal allocations of mul-
tiple divisible goods while reducing, but not eliminating, the agents’ incentives to lie.
The extent to which untruthfulness is reduced by their proposed mechanism is only
evaluated empirically and depends critically on their assumption that the resource
limitations are soft constraints. Very recent work by Maya and Nisan [2012] provides
evidence that truthfulness comes at a significant cost in terms of efficiency.
The recent papers of Guo and Conitzer [2010] and of Han et al. [2011] also con-
sider the truthful allocation of multiple divisible goods; they focus on additive linear
valuations and their goal is to maximize the social welfare (or efficiency) after scal-
ing every player’s reported valuations so that her total valuation for all items is 1.
Guo and Conitzer [2010] study two-agent instances, providing both upper and lower
bounds for the achievable approximation; Han et al. [2011] extend these results and
also study the multiple agents setting. For problem instances that may involve an
arbitrary number of items both papers provide negative results: no non-trivial approx-
imation factor can be achieved by any truthful mechanism when the number of play-
ers is also unbounded. For the two-player case, after Guo and Conitzer [2010] studied
some classes of dictatorial mechanisms, Han et al. [2011] showed that no dictatorial
mechanism can guarantee more than the trivial 0.5 factor. Interestingly, we recently
showed [Cole et al. 2013] that combining a special two-player version of the Partial Al-
locationmechanism with a dictatorial mechanism can actually beat this bound, achiev-
ing a 2/3 approximation.
The resource allocation literature has seen a resurgence of work studying fair
and efficient allocation for Leontief valuations [Ghodsi et al. 2011; Dolev et al. 2012;
Parkes et al. 2012; Gutman and Nisan 2012]. These valuations exhibit perfect comple-
ments and they are considered to be natural valuation abstractions for computing set-
tings where jobs need resources in fixed ratios. Ghodsi et al. [2011] defined the notion
of Dominant Resource Fairness (DRF), which is a generalization of the egalitarian so-
cial welfare to multiple types of resources. This solution has the advantage that it can
be implemented truthfully for this specific class of valuations; as the authors acknowl-
edge, the CEEI solution would be the preferred fair division mechanism in that setting
as well, and its main drawback is the fact that it cannot be implemented truthfully.
Parkes et al. [2012] assessed DRF in terms of the resulting efficiency, showing that
it performs poorly. Dolev et al. [2012] proposed an alternate fairness criterion called
Bottleneck Based Fairness, which Gutman and Nisan [2012] subsequently showed is
satisfied by the proportionally fair allocation. Gutman and Nisan [2012] also posed the
study of incentives related to this latter notion as an interesting open problem. Our re-
sults could potentially have significant impact on this line of work as we are providing
a truthful way to approximate a solution which is recognized as a good benchmark. It
would also be interesting to study the extent to which the Partial Allocation mecha-
nism can outperform the existing ones in terms of efficiency.
Most of the papersmentioned above contribute to our understanding of the trade-offs
between either truthfulness and fairness, or truthfulness and social welfare. Another
direction that has been actively pursued is to understand and quantify the interplay
between fairness and social welfare. Caragiannis et al. [2012] measured the deteriora-
tion of the social welfare caused by different fairness restrictions, the price of fairness.
More recently, Cohler et al. [2011] designed algorithms for computing allocations that
(approximately) maximize social welfare while satisfying envy-freeness. Also, the work
of Cohen et al. [2011], and of Feldman and Lai [2012] considers the question of finding
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mechanisms that satisfy both truthfulness and envy-freeness without sacrificing any
social welfare.
Our results fit into the general agenda of approximate mechanism design without
money, explicitly initiated by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [2009]. More interestingly,
the underlying connection with VCG payments proposes a framework for designing
truthful mechanisms without money and we anticipate that this might have a signifi-
cant impact on this literature.
2. PRELIMINARIES
Let M denote the set of m items and N the set of n bidders. Each item is divisible,
meaning that it can be divided into arbitrarily small pieces, which are then allocated
to different bidders. An allocation x of these items to the bidders defines the fraction xij
of each item j that each bidder i will be receiving; let F = {x | xij ≥ 0 and
∑
i xij ≤ 1}
denote the set of feasible allocations. Each bidder is assigned a weight bi ≥ 1 which
allows for interpersonal comparison of valuations, and can serve as priority in com-
puting applications, as clout in bargaining applications, or as a budget for the market
equilibrium interpretation of our results. We assume that bi is defined by the mecha-
nism as it cannot be truthfully elicited from the bidders. The preferences of each bidder
i ∈ N take the form of a valuation function vi(·), that assigns nonnegative values to
every allocation in F . We assume that every player’s valuation for a given allocation x
only depends on the bundle of items that she will be receiving.
We will present our results assuming that the valuation functions are homogeneous
of degree one, i.e. player i’s valuation for an allocation x′ = f ·x satisfies vi(x
′) = f ·vi(x),
for any scalar f > 0. We later discuss how to extend these results to general homoge-
neous valuations of degree d for which vi(x
′) = fd · vi(x). A couple of interesting exam-
ples of homogeneous valuations functions of degree one are additive linear valuations
and Leontief valuations; according to the former, every player has a valuation vij for
each item j and vi(x) =
∑
j xijvij , and according to the latter, each player i’s type cor-
responds to a set of values aij , one for each item, and vi(x) = minj {xij/aij}. (i.e. player
i desires the items in the ratio ai1 : ai2 : . . . : aim.)
An allocation x∗ ∈ F is Proportionally Fair (PF) if, for any other allocation x′ ∈ F
the (weighted) aggregate proportional change to the valuations after replacing x∗ with
x′ is not positive, i.e.: ∑
i∈N
bi[vi(x
′)− vi(x
∗)]
vi(x∗)
≤ 0. (1)
This allocation rule is a strong refinement of Pareto efficiency, since Pareto efficiency
only guarantees that if some player’s proportional change is strictly positive, then
there must be some player whose proportional change is negative. The Proportionally
Fair solution can also be defined as an allocation x ∈ F that maximizes
∏
i [vi(x)]
bi ,
or equivalently (after taking a logarithm), that maximizes
∑
i bi log vi(x); we will re-
fer to these two equivalent objectives as the PF objectives. Note that, although the
PF allocation need not be unique for a given instance, it does provide unique bidder
valuations [Eisenberg and Gale 1959].
We also note that the PF solution is equivalent to the Nash bargaining solution. John
Nash in his seminal paper [Nash 1950] considered an axiomatic approach to bargain-
ing and gave four axioms that any bargaining solution must satisfy. He showed that
these four axioms yield a unique solution which is captured by a convex program; this
convex program is equivalent to the one defined above for the PF solution. Another
well-studied allocation rule which is equivalent to the PF allocation is the Competi-
tive Equilibrium. Eisenberg [1961] showed that if all agents have valuation functions
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that are quasi-concave and homogeneous of degree 1, then the competitive equilib-
rium is also captured by the same convex program as the one for the PF solution. The
Competitive Equilibrium with Equal Incomes (CEEI) has been proposed as the ideal
allocation rule for fairness in microeconomics [Varian 1974; Hylland and Zeckhauser
1979; Budish 2010; Othman et al. 2010].
Given a valuation function reported from each bidder, we want to designmechanisms
that output an allocation of items to bidders. We restrict ourselves to truthful mech-
anisms, i.e. mechanisms such that any false report from a bidder will never return
her a more valuable allocation. Since proportional fairness cannot be implemented via
truthful mechanisms, we will measure the performance of our mechanisms based on
the extent to which they approximate this benchmark. More specifically, the approx-
imation factor, or competitive factor of a mechanism will correspond to the minimum
value of ρ(I) across all relevant instances I, where
ρ(I) = min
i∈N
{
vi(x)
vi(x∗)
}
,
and x, x∗ are the allocation generated by the mechanism for instance I and the PF
allocation of I respectively.
3. THE PARTIAL ALLOCATION MECHANISM
In this section, we define the Partial Allocation (PA) mechanism as a novel way to
allocate divisible items to bidders with homogeneous valuation functions of degree
one. We subsequently prove that this non-dictatorial mechanism not only achieves
truthfulness, but also guarantees that every bidder will receive at least a 1/e fraction of
the valuation that she deserves, according to the PF solution. This mechanism depends
on a subroutine that computes the PF allocation for the problem instance at hand; we
therefore later study the running time of this subroutine, as well as the robustness of
our results in case this subroutine returns only approximate solutions.
The PA mechanism elicits the valuation function vi(·) from each player i and it com-
putes the PF allocation x∗ considering all the players’ valuations. The final allocation
x output by the mechanism gives each player i only a fraction fi of her PF bundle x
∗
i ,
i.e. for every item j of which the PF allocation assigned to her a portion of size x∗ij , the
PA mechanism instead assigns to her a portion of size fi · x
∗
ij , where fi ∈ [0, 1] depends
on the extent to which the presence of player i inconveniences the other players; the
value of fi may therefore vary across different players. The following steps give a more
precise description of the mechanism.
ALGORITHM 1: The Partial Allocation mechanism.
1 Compute the PF allocation x∗ based on the reported bids.
2 For each player i, compute the PF allocation x∗−i that would arise in her absence.
3 Allocate to each player i a fraction fi of everything that she receives according to x
∗, where
fi =
( ∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x
∗)]bi′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x
∗
−i)]
b
i′
)
1/bi
. (2)
LEMMA 3.1. The allocation x produced by the PA mechanism is feasible.
PROOF. Since the PF allocation x∗ is feasible, to verify that the allocation produced
by the PA mechanism is also feasible, it suffices to show that fi ∈ [0, 1] for every bidder
i. The fact that fi ≥ 0 is clear since both the numerator and the denominator are
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non-negative. To show that fi ≤ 1, note that
x∗−i = argmax
x′∈F
∏
i′ 6=i
vi′(x
′)
 .
Since x∗ remains a feasible allocation (x∗ ∈ F ) after removing bidder i (we can just
discard bidder i’s share), this implies∏
i′ 6=i
vi′(x
∗) ≤
∏
i′ 6=i
vi′(x
∗
−i).
3.1. Truthfulness
We now show that, despite the fact that this mechanism is not dictatorial and does not
use monetary payments, it is still in the best interest of every player to report her true
valuation function, irrespective of what the other players do.
THEOREM 3.2. The PA mechanism is truthful.
PROOF. In order to prove this theorem, we approach the PA mechanism from the
perspective of some arbitrary player i. Let v¯i′(·) denote the valuation function that each
player i′ 6= i reports to the PA mechanism. We assume that the valuation functions
reported by these players may differ from their true ones, vi′(·). Player i is faced with
the options of, either reporting her true valuation function vi(·), or reporting some false
valuation function v¯i(·). After every player has reported some valuation function, the
PA mechanism computes the PF allocation with respect to these valuation functions;
let xT denote the PF allocation that arises if player i reports the truth and xL otherwise.
Finally, player i receives a fraction of what the computed PF allocation assigned to her,
and how big or small this fraction will be depends on the computed PF allocation. Let
fT denote the fraction of her allocation that player iwill receive if xT is the computed PF
allocation and fL otherwise. Since the players have homogeneous valuation functions
of degree one, what we need to show is that fT vi(xT) ≥ fL vi(xL), or equivalently that
[fT vi(xT)]
bi ≥ [fL vi(xL)]
bi .
Note that the denominators of both fractions fT and fL, as given by Equation (2), will
be the same since they are independent of the valuation function reported by player i.
Our problem therefore reduces to proving that
[vi(xT)]
bi ·
∏
i′ 6=i
[v¯i′ (xT)]
b
i′ ≥ [vi(xL)]
bi ·
∏
i′ 6=i
[v¯i′ (xL)]
b
i′ . (3)
To verify that this inequality holds we use the fact that the PF allocation is the one
that maximizes the product of the corresponding reported valuations. This means that
xT = argmax
x∈F
[vi(x)]bi ·∏
i′ 6=i
[v¯i′ (x)]
b
i′
 ,
and since xL ∈ F , this implies that Inequality (3) holds, and hence reporting her true
valuation function is a dominant strategy for every player i.
The arguments used in the proof of Theorem 3.2 imply that, given the valuation func-
tions reported by all the other players i′ 6= i, player i can effectively choose any bundle
that she wishes, but for each bundle the mechanism defines what fraction player i can
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keep. One can therefore think of the fraction of the bundle thrown away as a form of
non-monetary “payment” that the player must suffer in exchange for that bundle, with
different bundles matched to different payments. The fact that the PA mechanism is
truthful implies that these payments, in the form of fractions, make the bundle allo-
cated to her by allocation x∗ the most desirable one. We revisit this interpretation in
Section 5.
3.2. Approximation
Before studying the approximation factor of the PA mechanism, we first state a lemma
which will be useful for proving Theorem 3.4 (its proof is deferred to the Appendix).
LEMMA 3.3. For any set of pairs (δi, βi) with βi ≥ 1 and
∑
i βi · δi ≤ b the following
holds (where B =
∑
i βi) ∏
i
(1 + δi)
βi ≤
(
1 +
b
B
)B
.
Using this lemma we can now prove tight bounds for the approximation factor of
the Partial Allocation mechanism. As we show in this proof, the approximation factor
depends directly on the relative weights of the players. For simplicity in expressing
the approximation factor, let bmin denote the smallest value of bi across all bidders of
an instance and let B¯ =
(∑
i∈N bi
)
− bmin be the sum of the bi values of all the other
bidders. Finally, let ψ = B¯/bmin denote the ratio of these two values.
THEOREM 3.4. The approximation factor of the Partial Allocation mechanism for
the class of problem instances of some given ψ value is exactly
(
1 +
1
ψ
)−ψ
.
PROOF. The PA mechanism allocates to each player i a fraction fi of her PF allo-
cation, and for the class of homogeneous valuation functions of degree one this means
that the final valuation of player i will be vi(x) = fi · vi(x
∗). The approximation factor
guaranteed by the mechanism is therefore equal to mini{fi}. Without loss of general-
ity, let player i be the one with the minimum value of fi. In the PF allocation x
∗
−i that
the PA mechanism computes after removing player i, every other player i′ experiences
a value of vi′ (x
∗
−i). Let di′ denote the proportional change between the valuation of
player i′ for allocation x∗ and allocation x∗−i, i.e.
vi′(x
∗
−i) = (1 + di′)vi′ (x
∗).
Substituting for vi′(x
∗
−i) in Equation (2) yields:
fi =
(
1∏
i′ 6=i(1 + di′ )
b
i′
)1/bi
. (4)
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Since x∗ is a PF allocation, Inequality (1) implies that∑
i′∈N
bi′ [vi′ (x
∗
−i)− vi′(x
∗)]
vi′ (x∗)
≤ 0 ⇐⇒
∑
i′ 6=i
bi′di′ +
bi[vi(x
∗
−i)− vi(x
∗)]
vi(x∗)
≤ 0 ⇐⇒
∑
i′ 6=i
bi′di′ ≤ bi. (5)
The last equivalence holds due to the fact that vi(x
∗
−i) = 0, since allocation x
∗
−i clearly
assigns nothing to player i.
Let B−i =
∑
i′ 6=i bi′ ; using Inequality (5) and Lemma 3.3 (on substituting bi for b, di′
for δi, bi′ for βi, and B−i for B), it follows from Equation (4) that
fi ≥
(
1 +
bi
B−i
)−B−i
bi
. (6)
To verify that this bound is tight, consider any instance with just one item and the
given ψ value. The PF solution dictates that each player should be receiving a fraction
of the item proportional to the player’s bi value. The removal of a player i therefore
leads to a proportional increase of exactly bi/B−i for each of the other players’ PF
valuation. The PA mechanism therefore assigns to every player i a fraction of her PF
allocation which is equal to the right hand side of Inequality (6). The player with the
smallest bi value receives the smallest fraction.
The approximation factor of Theorem 3.4 implies that fi ≥ 1/2 for instances with two
players having equal bi values, and fi ≥ 1/e even when ψ goes to infinity; we therefore
get the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.5. The Partial Allocation mechanism always yields an allocation x
such that for every participating player i
vi(x) ≥
1
e
· vi(x
∗).
To complement this approximation factor, we now provide a negative result showing
that, even for the special case of additive linear valuations, no truthful mechanism
can guarantee an approximation factor better than n+1
2n for problem instances with n
players.
THEOREM 3.6. There is no truthful mechanism that can guarantee an approxima-
tion factor greater than n+1
2n +ǫ for any constant ǫ > 0 for all n-player problem instances,
even if the valuations are restricted to being additive linear.
PROOF. For an arbitrary real value of n > 1, let ρ = n+1
2n , and assume that Q is a
truthful resource allocation mechanism that guarantees a (ρ+ ǫ) approximation for all
n-player problem instances, where ǫ is a positive constant. This mechanism receives as
input the bidders’ valuations and it returns a valid (fractional) allocation of the items.
We will define n + 1 different input instances for this mechanism, each of which will
consist of n bidders andm = (k+1)n items, where k > 2ǫ will take very large values. In
order to prove the theorem, we will then show that Q cannot simultaneously achieve
this approximation guarantee for all these instances, leading to a contradiction. For
simplicity we will refer to each bidder with a number from 1 to n, to each item with a
number from 1 to (k+1)n, and to each problem instance with a number from 1 to n+1.
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We start by defining the first n problem instances. For i ≤ n, let problem instance i
be as follows: Every bidder i′ 6= i has a valuation of kn + 1 for item i′ and a valuation
of 1 for every other item; bidder i has a valuation of 1 for all items. In other words, all
bidders except bidder i have a strong preference for just one item, which is different for
each one of them. The PF allocation for such additive linear valuations dictates that
every bidder i′ 6= i is allocated only item i′, while bidder i is allocated all the remaining
kn+1 items. SinceQ achieves a ρ+ǫ approximation for this instance, it needs to provide
bidder i with an allocation which the bidder values at least at (ρ+ ǫ) (kn+ 1). In order
to achieve this, mechanism Q can assign to this bidder fractions of the set M−i of the
n − 1 items that the PF solution allocates to the other bidders as well as fractions of
the set Mi of the kn + 1 items that the PF allocation allocates to bidder i. Even if all
of the n − 1 items of M−i were fully allocated to bidder i, the mechanism would still
need to assign to this bidder an allocation of value at least (ρ+ ǫ) (kn + 1) − (n − 1)
using items from Mi. Since k >
2
ǫ , n − 1 <
ǫ
2
(kn + 1), and therefore mechanism Q
will need to allocate to bidder i a fractional assignment of items in Mi that the bidder
values at least at
(
ρ+ ǫ
2
)
(kn+ 1). This implies that there must exist at least one item
in Mi of which bidder i is allocated a fraction of size at least
(
ρ+ ǫ
2
)
. Since all the
items inMi are identical and the numbering of the items is arbitrary, we can, without
loss of generality, assume that this item is item i. We have therefore shown that, for
every instance i ≤ n mechanism Q will have to assign to bidder i at least
(
ρ+ ǫ
2
)
of
item i, and an allocation of items in Mi that guarantees her a valuation of at least(
ρ+ ǫ
2
)
(kn+ 1).
We now define problem instance n + 1, in which every bidder i has a valuation of
kn + 1 for item i and a valuation of 1 for all other items. The PF solution for this
instance would allocate to each bidder i all of item i, as well as k items from the
set {n+ 1, ..., (k + 1)n} (or more generally, fractions of these items that add up to k).
Clearly, every bidder i can unilaterally misreport her valuation leading to problem in-
stance i instead of this instance; so, in order to maintain truthfulness, mechanism Q
will have to provide every bidder i of problem instance n+1with at least the value that
such a deviation would provide her with. One can quickly verify that, even if mecha-
nism Q when faced with problem instance i provided bidder i with no more than a(
ρ+ ǫ
2
)
fraction of item i, still such a deviation would provide bidder i with a valuation
of at least (
ρ+
ǫ
2
)
(kn+ 1) +
(
ρ+
ǫ
2
)
kn ≥
(
ρ+
ǫ
2
)
2kn.
The first term of the left hand side comes from the fraction of item i that the bidder
receives and the second term comes from the average fraction of the remaining items.
If we substitute ρ = n+1
2n , we get that the truthfulness of Q implies that every bidder i
of problem instance n+ 1 will have to receive an allocation of value at least(
n+ 1
2n
+
ǫ
2
)
2kn = kn+ k + ǫkn.
For any given constant value of ǫ though, since k > 2ǫ and n > 1, every bidder will need
to be assigned an allocation that she values at more than kn + k + 2, which is greater
than the valuation of kn + k + 1 that the player receives in the PF solution. This is
obviously a contradiction since the PF solution is Pareto efficient and there cannot
exist any other allocation for which all bidders receive a strictly greater valuation.
Theorem 3.6 implies that, even if all the players have equal bi values, no truthful
mechanism can guarantee a greater than 3/4 approximation even for instances with
just two bidders, and this bound drops further as the number of bidders increases,
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finally converging to 1/2. To complement the statement of Corollary 3.5, we therefore
get the following corollary.
COROLLARY 3.7. No truthful mechanism can guarantee that it will always yield
an allocation x such that for any ǫ > 0 and for every participating player i
vi(x) ≥
(
1
2
+ ǫ
)
· vi(x
∗).
3.3. Envy-Freeness
We now consider the question of whether the outcomes that the Partial Allocation
mechanism yields are envy-free; we show that, for two well studied types of valuation
functions this is indeed the case, thus providing further evidence of the fairness prop-
erties of this mechanism. We start by showing that, if the bidders have additive linear
valuations, then the outcome that the PA mechanism outputs is also envy-free.
THEOREM 3.8. The PA mechanism is envy-free for additive linear valuations.
PROOF. Let x∗ denote the PF allocation including all the bidders, with each bidder’s
valuations scaled so that vi(x
∗) = 1. Let vi(x
∗
j ) denote the value of bidder i for x
∗
j , the PF
share of bidder j in x∗, and let x∗−i denote the PF allocation that arises after removing
some bidder i. The PA mechanism allocates each (unweighted) bidder i a fraction fi of
her PF share, where
fi =
∏
k 6=i [vk(x
∗)]∏
k 6=i [vk(x
∗
−i)]
=
1∏
k 6=i [vk(x
∗
−i)]
.
In order to prove that the PA mechanism is envy-free, we need to show that for every
bidder i, and for all j 6= i, fivi(x
∗) ≥ fjvi(x
∗
j ), or equivalently
1∏
k 6=i [vk(x
∗
−i)]
≥
vi(x
∗
j )∏
k 6=j [vk(x
∗
−j)]
⇔
∏
k 6=j
[vk(x
∗
−j)] ≥ vi(x
∗
j )
∏
k 6=i
[vk(x
∗
−i)]. (7)
To prove the above inequality, we will modify allocation x∗−i so as to create an allocation
x−j such that ∏
k 6=j
[vk(x−j)] ≥ vi(x
∗
j )
∏
k 6=i
[vk(x
∗
−i)]. (8)
Clearly, for any feasible allocation x−j it must be the case that∏
k 6=j
[vk(x
∗
−j)] ≥
∏
k 6=j
[vk(x−j)], (9)
since x∗−j is, by definition, the feasible allocation that maximizes this product. There-
fore, combining Inequalities (8) and (9) implies Inequality (7). It remains to construct
an allocation x−j satisfying Inequality (8).
To construct allocation x−j , we use allocation x
∗
−i and we define the following
weighted directed graph G based on x∗−i: the set of vertices corresponds to the set
of bidders, and a directed edge from the vertex for bidder j to the vertex for bidder k
exists if and only if x∗−i allocates to bidder j portions of items that were instead al-
located to bidder k in x∗. The weight of such an edge is equal to the total value that
bidder j sees in all these portions. Since the valuations of all bidders are scaled so
that vj(x
∗) = 1 for all j, this implies that, if the weight of some edge (j, k) is v (w.r.t.
these scaled valuations), then the total value of bidder k for those same portions that
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bidder j values at v, is at least v. If that were not the case, then x∗ would not have
allocated those portions to bidder k; allocating them to bidder j instead would lead to a
positive aggregate proportional change to the valuations. This means that we can as-
sume, without loss of generality, that the graph is a directed acyclic one; if not, we can
rearrange the allocation so as to remove any directed cycles from this graph without
decreasing any bidder’s valuation.
Also note that for every bidder k 6= i it must be the case that vk(x
∗
−i) ≥ vk(x
∗). To
verify this fact, assume that it is not true, and let k be the bidder with the minimum
value vk(x
∗
−i). Since vk(x
∗
−i) < vk(x
∗) = 1, it must be the case that x∗−i does not allocate
to bidder k all of her PF share according to x∗, thus the vertex for bidder k has incom-
ing edges of positive weight in the directed acyclic graph G, and it therefore belongs
to some directed path. The very first vertex of this path is a source of G that corre-
sponds to some bidder s; the fact that this vertex has no incoming edges implies that
vs(x
∗
−i) ≥ vs(x
∗) = 1. Since vk(x
∗
−i) < 1 we can deduce that there exists some directed
edge (α, β) along the path from s to k such that vα(x
∗
−i) > vβ(x
∗
−i). Returning some of
the portions contributing to this edge from bidder α to bidder β will lead to a positive
aggregate proportional change to the valuations, contradicting that x∗−i is the PF allo-
cation excluding bidder i. Having shown that vk(x
∗
−i) ≥ vk(x
∗) for every bidder k other
than i, we can now deduce that the total weight of incoming edges for the vertex in
G corresponding to any bidder k 6= i is no more than the total weight of the outgoing
edges. Finally, this also implies that the only sink of G will have to be the vertex for
bidder i.
The first step of our construction starts from allocation x∗−i and it reallocates some
of the x∗−i allocation, leading to a new allocation x¯. Using the directed subtree of G
rooted at the vertex of bidder j, we reduce to zero the weights of the edges leaving j
by reducing the allocation at j, increasing the allocation at i, and suitably changing
the allocation of other bidders. More specifically, we start by returning all the portions
that bidder j was allocated in x∗−i but not in x
∗, back to the bidders who were allocated
these portions in x∗. These bidders to whom some portions were returned then return
portions of equal value that they too were allocated in x∗−i but not in x
∗; this is possible
since, for each such bidder, the total incoming edge weight of its vertex is no more than
the total outgoing edge weight. We repeat this process until the sink, the vertex for
bidder i, is reached. One can quickly verify that
vi(x¯) ≥ vj(x
∗
−i)− vj(x¯); (10)
in words, the value that bidder i gained in this transition from x∗−i to x¯ is at least as
large as the value that bidder j lost in that same transition. Finally, in allocation x¯,
whatever value vj(x¯) bidder j is left with comes only from portions that were part of
her PF share in x∗.
Bidder j’s total valuation for any portions of her PF share in x∗ that are allocated
to other bidders in x∗−i is equal to 1 − vj(x¯). Thus, bidder i’s valuation for those same
portions will be at most 1 − vj(x¯); otherwise modifying x
∗ by allocating these por-
tions to i would lead to a positive aggregate change to the valuations. This means that
for bidder i the portions remaining with bidder j in allocation x¯ have value at least
vi(x
∗
j )− (1− vj(x¯)). We conclude the construction of allocation x−j by allocating all the
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remaining portions allocated to bidder j in x¯ to bidder i, leading to
vi(x−j) ≥ vi(x¯) + vi(x
∗
j )− (1− vj(x¯))
≥ vj(x
∗
−i)− vj(x¯) + vi(x
∗
j )− (1 − vj(x¯))
≥ vj(x
∗
−i)− 1 + vi(x
∗
j )
≥ [vj(x
∗
−i)− 1]vi(x
∗
j ) + vi(x
∗
j )
= vj(x
∗
−i)vi(x
∗
j ).
The second inequality is deduced by substituting from Inequality (10); the last in-
equality can be verified by using the fact that vi(x
∗
j ) ≤ 1, and multiplying both sides of
this inequality with the non-negative value vj(x
∗
−i)− 1, leading to [vj(x
∗
−i)− 1]vi(x
∗
j ) ≤
vj(x
∗
−i) − 1. Also note that for all k /∈ {i, j}, vk(x−j) = vk(x
∗
−i). We therefore conclude
that Inequality (8) is true.
Following the same proof structure we can now also show that the PA mechanism is
envy-free when the bidders have Leontief valuations.
THEOREM 3.9. The PA mechanism is envy-free for Leontief valuations.
PROOF. Just as in the proof of Theorem 3.8, let x∗ denote the PF allocation including
all the bidders, with each bidder’s valuations scaled so that vi(x
∗) = 1. Also, let vi(x
∗
j )
denote the value of bidder i for x∗j , the PF share of bidder j in x
∗, and let x∗−i denote
the PF allocation that arises after removing some bidder i.
Following the steps of the proof of Theorem 3.8 we can reduce the problem of showing
that the PA mechanism is envy-free to constructing an allocation x−j that satisfies
Inequality (8), i.e. such that∏
k 6=j
[vk(x
∗
−j)] ≥
∏
k 6=j
[vk(x−j)] ≥ vi(x
∗
j )
∏
k 6=i
[vk(x
∗
−i)].
To construct allocation x−j , we start from allocation x
∗
−i and we reallocate the bundle
of item fractions allocated to bidder j in x∗−i to bidder i instead, while maintaining the
same allocations for all other bidders. Therefore, after simplifying the latter inequality
using the fact that vk(x−j) = vk(x
∗
−i) for all k 6= i, j, what we need to show is that
vi(x−j) ≥ vi(x
∗
j )vj(x
∗
−i). (11)
Note that, given the structure of Leontief valuations, every bidder is interested in
bundles of item fractions that satisfy specific proportions. We can, without loss of gen-
erality, assume that the PF allocation allocates a fraction of some resource to a bidder
only when this fraction leads to an increase of the bidder’s valuation. This means that
the bundle of item fractions allocated to bidder j in x∗ and the one allocated to her in
x∗−i both satisfy the same proportions; that is, there exists some constant c such that,
for each one of the items, bidder j receives in x∗−i exactly c times the amount of that
item that she receives in x∗. As a result, given the fact that Leontief valuations are
homogeneous of degree one, vj(x
∗
−i) = c · vj(x
∗) = c (using the fact that vj(x
∗) = 1).
Similarly, since x−j allocates to bidder i the bundle of bidder j in x
∗
−i, and using the
homogeneous structure of Leontief valuations, this implies that vi(x−j) = c · vi(x
∗
j ).
Substituting these two equalities in Inequality (11) verifies that the inequality is true,
thus concluding the proof.
3.4. Running Time and Robustness
The PA mechanism has reduced the problem of truthfully implementing a constant
factor approximation of the PF allocation to computing exact PF allocations for several
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different problem instances, as this is the only subroutine that the mechanism calls.
If the valuation functions of the players are affine, then there is a polynomial time
algorithm to compute the exact PF allocation [Devanur et al. 2008; Jain and Vazirani
2007].
We now show that, even if the PF solution can be only approximately computed in
polynomial time, our truthfulness and approximation related statements are robust
with respect to such approximations (all the proofs of this subsection are deferred to
the Appendix). More specifically, we assume that the PA mechanism uses a polynomial
time algorithm that computes a feasible allocation x˜ instead of x∗ such that[∏
i
[vi(x˜)]
bi
]1/B
≥
[
(1 − ǫ)
∏
i
[vi(x
∗)]bi
]1/B
, where B =
n∑
i=1
bi.
Using this algorithm, the PA mechanism can be adapted as follows:
ALGORITHM 2: The Approximate Partial Allocation mechanism.
1 Compute the approximate PF allocation x˜ based on the reported bids.
2 For each player i, compute the approximate PF allocation x˜−i that would arise in her absence.
3 Allocate to each player i a fraction f˜i of everything that she receives according to x˜, where
f˜i = min
1 ,
( ∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x˜)]
b
i′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x˜−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi . (12)
For this adapted version of the PA mechanism to remain feasible, we need to make
sure that f˜i remains less than or equal to 1. Even if, for some reason, the allocation x˜−i
computed by the approximation algorithm does not satisfy this property, the adapted
mechanism will then choose f˜i = 1 instead.
We start by showing two lemmas verifying that this adapted version of the PA mech-
anism is robust both with respect to the approximation factor it guarantees and with
respect to the truthfulness guarantee.
LEMMA 3.10. The approximation factor of the adapted PA mechanism for the class
of problem instances of some given ψ value is at least
(1− ǫ)
(
1 +
1
ψ
)−ψ
.
LEMMA 3.11. If a player misreports her preferences to the adapted PA mechanism,
she may increase her valuation by at most a factor (1− ǫ)−2.
Finally, we show that if the valuation functions are, for example, concave and ho-
mogeneous of degree one, then a feasible approximate PF allocation can indeed be
computed in polynomial time.
LEMMA 3.12. For concave homogeneous valuation functions of degree one, there
exists an algorithm that computes a feasible allocation x˜ in time polynomial in log 1/ǫ
and the problem size, such that∏
i
[vi(x˜)]
bi ≥ (1− ǫ)
∏
i
[vi(x
∗)]bi .
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3.5. Extension to General Homogeneous Valuations
We can actually extend most of the results that we have shown for homogeneous val-
uation functions of degree one to any valuation function that can be expressed as
vi(f · x) = gi(f) · vi(x), where gi(·) is some increasing invertible function; for homo-
geneous valuation functions of degree d, this function is gi(f) = f
d. If this function
is known for each bidder, we can then adapt the PA mechanism as follows: instead of
allocating to bidder i a fraction fi of her allocation according to x
∗ as defined in Equa-
tion (2), we instead allocate to this bidder a fraction g−1i (fi), where g
−1
i (·) is the inverse
function of gi(·). If, for example, some bidder has a homogeneous valuation function of
degree d, then allocating her a fraction f
1/d
i of her PF allocation has the desired effect
and both truthfulness and the same approximation factor guarantees still hold. The
idea behind this transformation is that all that we need in order to achieve truthful-
ness and the approximation factor is to be able to discard some fraction of a bidder’s
allocation knowing exactly what fraction of her valuation this will correspond to.
4. THE STRONG DEMAND MATCHING MECHANISM
The main result of the previous section shows that one can guarantee a good constant
factor approximation for any problem instance within a very large class of bidder valu-
ations. The subsequent impossibility result shows that, even if we restrict ourselves to
problem instances with additive linear bidder valuations, no truthful mechanism can
guarantee more than a 1/2 approximation.
In this section we study the question of whether one can achieve even better factors
when restricted to some well-motivated class of instances. We focus on additive linear
valuations, and we provide a positive answer to this question for problem instances
where every item is highly demanded. More formally, we consider problem instances
for which the PF price (or equivalently the competitive equilibrium price) of every
item is large when the budget of every player is fixed to one unit of scrip money5. The
motivation behind this class of instances comes from problems such as the one that
arose with the Czech privatization auctions [Aggarwal and Harper 2000]. For such in-
stances, where the number of players is much higher than the number of items, one
naturally anticipates that all item prices will be high in equilibrium.
For the rest of the chapter we assume that the weights of all players are equal and
that their valuations are additive linear. Let p∗j denote the PF price of item j when
every bidder i’s budget bi is equal to 1. Our main result in this section is the following:
THEOREM 4.1. For additive linear valuations there exists a truthful mechanism
that achieves an approximation factor of minj
{
p∗j/⌈p
∗
j⌉
}
.
Note that if k = minj p
∗
j , then this approximation factor is at least k/(k + 1).
We now describe our solution which we call the Strong Demand Matching mecha-
nism (SDM). Informally speaking, SDM starts by giving every bidder a unit amount
of scrip money. It then aims to discover minimal item prices such that the demand of
each bidder at these prices can be satisfied using (a fraction of) just one item. In es-
sense, our mechanism is restricted to computing allocations that assign each bidder to
just one item, and this restriction of the output space renders the mechanism truthful
and gives an approximation guarantee much better than that of the PA mechanism for
instances where every item is highly demanded.
The procedure used by our mechanism is reminiscent of the method utilized by De-
mange et al. for multi-unit auctions [Demange et al. 1986]. Recall that this method
5Remark: Our mechanism does not make this assumption, but the approximation guarantees are much
better with this assumption.
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increases the prices of all over-demanded items uniformly until the set R of over-
demanded items changes, iterating this process until R becomes empty. At that point,
bidders are matched to preferred items. For our setting, each bidder will seek to spend
all her money, and we employ an analogous rising price methodology, again making
allocations when the set of over-demanded items is empty. In our setting, the price in-
creases are multiplicative rather than additive, however. This approach also has some
commonality with the algorithm of Devanur et al. [Devanur et al. 2008] for computing
the competitive equilibrium for divisible items and bidders with additive linear valu-
ations. Their algorithm also proceeds by increasing the prices of over-demanded items
multiplicatively. Of course, their algorithm does not yield a truthful mechanism. Also,
in order to achieve polynomial running time in computing the competitive equilib-
rium, their algorithm needs, at any one time, to be increasing the prices of a carefully
selected subset of these items; this appears to make their algorithm quite dissimilar
to ours. Next we specify our mechanism in more detail.
Let pj denote the price of item j, and let the bang per buck that bidder i gets from
item j equal vij/pj. We say that item j is an MBB item of bidder i if she gets the
maximum bang per buck from that item6. For a given price vector p, let the demand
graph D(p) be a bipartite graph with bidders on one side and items on the other, such
that there is an edge between bidder i and item j if and only if j is an MBB item of
bidder i. We call cj = ⌊pj⌋ the capacity of item j when its price is pj , and we say an
assignment of bidders to items is valid if it matches each bidder to one of her MBB
items and no item j is matched to more than cj bidders. Given a valid assignment
A, we say an item j is reachable from bidder i if there exists an alternating path
(i, j1, i1, j2, i2, · · · , jk, ik, j) in the graph D(p) such that edges (i1, j1), · · · , (ik, jk) lie in
the assignmentA. Finally, let d(R) be the collection of bidders with all their MBB items
in set R. Using these notions, we define the Strong Demand Matching mechanism in
Figure 3.
ALGORITHM 3: The Strong Demand Matching mechanism.
1 Initialize the price of every item j to pj = 1.
2 Find a valid assignment maximizing the number of matched bidders.
3 if all the bidders are matched then
4 conclude with Step 15.
5 Let U be the set of bidders who are not matched in Step 2.
6 Let R be the set of all items reachable from bidders in the set U .
7 Increase the price of each item j in R from pj to r · pj , where r ≥ 1 is the minimum value for
which one of the following events takes place:
8 if the price of an item in R reaches an integral value then
9 continue with Step 2.
10 if the set of MBB items of some bidder i ∈ d(R) increases, causing the set R to grow then
11 if for each item j added to R, the number of bidders already matched to it equals cj then
12 continue with Step 6.
13 if some item j added to R has cj greater than the number of bidders matched to it then
14 continue with Step 2.
15
16 Bidders matched to some item j are allocated a fraction 1/pj of it.
6Note that for each bidder there could be multiple MBB items and that in the PF solution bidders are only
allocated such MBB items.
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4.1. Running time
We first explain how to carry out Steps 6-14. Set R can be computed using a breadth-
first-search like algorithm. To determine when the event of Step 8 takes place, we just
need to know the smallest ⌈pj⌉/pj ratio over all items whose price is being increased.
For the event of Step 10, we need to calculate, for each bidder in d(R), the ratio of the
bang per buck for her MBB items and for the items outside the set R.
In terms of running time, if c(R) =
∑
j∈R cj denotes the total capacity in R, it is not
difficult to see that if U is non-empty, |d(R)| > c(R). Note that each time either the
event of Step 8 or the event of Step 13 occurs, c(R) increases by at least 1, and thus,
using the alternating path from a bidder in the set U to the corresponding item, we
can increase the number of matched bidders by at least 1; this means that this can
occur at most n times. The only other events are the unions (of connected components
in graph D(p)) resulting from the event of Step 11. Between successive iterations of
either Step 8 or 13, there can be at most min(n,m) iterations of Step 11. Thus there
are O(n ·min(n,m)) iterations of Step 11 overall and O(n) iterations of Steps 8 and 13.
4.2. Truthfulness and Approximation
The proofs of the truthfulness and the approximation of the SDM mechanism use
the following lemma which states that the prices computed by the mechanism are
the minimum prices supporting a valid assignment. An analogous result was shown
in [Demange et al. 1986] for a multi-unit auction of non-divisible items. We provide an
algorithmic argument.
LEMMA 4.2. For any problem instance, if p ≥ 1 is a set of prices for which there
exists a valid assignment, then the prices q computed by the SDM mechanism will
satisfy q ≤ p.
PROOF. Aiming for a contradiction, assume that qj > pj for some item j, and let q˜
be the maximal price vector that the SDM mechanism reaches before increasing the
price of some item j′ beyond pj′ for the first time. In other words, q˜ ≤ p and q˜j′ = pj′ .
Also, let S = {j ∈ M | q˜j = pj}, which implies that q˜j < pj for all j /∈ S. Clearly, any
bidder i who has MBB items in S at prices q˜ will not be interested in any other item at
prices p. This implies that the valid assignment that exists for prices p assigns every
such bidder to one of her MBB items j ∈ S. Therefore, the total capacity of items in
S at prices q˜ is large enough to support all these bidders and hence no item in S will
be over-demanded at prices q˜. As a result, the SDM mechanism will not increase the
price of any item in S, which leads us to a contradiction.
Using this lemma we can now prove the statements regarding the truthfulness and
the approximation factor of SDM; the following two lemmata imply Theorem 4.1.
LEMMA 4.3. The SDM mechanism is truthful.
PROOF. Given a problem instance, fix some bidder i and let x′ and q′ denote the
assignment and the prices that the SDM mechanism outputs instead of x and q when
this bidder reports a valuation vector v′i instead of her true valuation vector vi.
If the item j to which bidder i is assigned in x′ is one of her MBB items w.r.t. her true
valuations vi and prices q
′, then x′ would be a valid assignment for prices q′ even if the
bidder had not lied. Lemma 4.2 therefore implies that q ≤ q′. Since the item to which
bidder i is assigned by x is an MBB item and q ≤ q′, we can conclude that vi(x) ≥ vi(x
′).
If on the other hand item j is not an MBB item w.r.t. the true valuations of bidder
i and prices q′, we consider an alternative valid assignment and prices. Starting from
prices q′, we run the steps of the SDM mechanism assuming bidder i has reported
her true valuations vi, and we consider the assignment x¯ and the prices q¯ that the
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mechanism would yield upon termination. Assignment x¯ would clearly be valid for
prices q¯ if bidder i had reported the truth; therefore Lemma 4.2 implies q ≤ q¯ and thus
vi(x) ≥ vi(x¯). As a result, to conclude the proof it suffices to show that vi(x¯) ≥ vi(x
′). To
verify this fact, we show that q′j = q¯j , implying that x¯ allocates to i (a fraction of) some
item which she values at least as much as a 1/q′j fraction of item j.
Consider the assignment x′−i that matches all bidders i
′ 6= i according to x′ and
leaves bidder i unmatched. In the graphD(q′), if item j is reachable from bidder i given
the valid assignment x′−i, then all bidders would be matched by the very first execution
of Step 1 of the mechanism. This is true because the capacity of item j according to
prices q′ is greater than the number of bidders matched to it in x′−i. The alternating
path (i, j1, i1, j2, i2, · · · , jk, ik, j) implied by the reachability can therefore be used to
ensure that bidder i is matched to an MBB item as well; this is achieved by matching
i to j1, i1 to j2 and so on. Otherwise, if not all bidders can be matched in that very first
step of the SDM mechanism, the mechanism can instead match the bidders according
to x′−i and set U = {i}.
7 Before the price of item j can be increased, Step 10 must add
this item to the set R. If this happens though, item j becomes reachable from bidder
i thus causing an alternating path to form, and the next execution of Step 1 of the
mechanism yields a valid assignment before q′j is ever increased.
LEMMA 4.4. The SDM mechanism achieves an approximation factor of
minj
{
p∗j/⌈p
∗
j⌉
}
.
PROOF. We start by showing that there must exist a valid assignment at prices fp∗,
where p∗ corresponds to the PF prices and f = maxj⌈p
∗
j⌉/p
∗
j . Given any PF allocation
x∗, we consider the bipartite graph on items and bidders that has an edge between
a bidder and an item if and only if x∗ assigns a portion of the item to that bidder. If
there exists a cycle in this graph, one can remove an edge in this cycle by reallocating
along the cycle while maintaining the valuation of every bidder. To verify that this is
possible, note that all the items that a bidder is connected to by an edge are MBB items
for this bidder, and therefore the bidder is indifferent regarding how her spending is
distributed among them. Hence w.l.o.g. we can assume that the graph of x∗ is a forest.
For a given tree in this forest, root it at an arbitrary bidder. For each bidder in this
tree, assign her to one of her child items, if any, and otherwise to her parent item. Note
that the MBB items for each bidder at prices fp∗ are the same as at prices p∗, so every
bidder is assigned to one of her MBB items. Therefore, in order to conclude that this
assignment is valid at prices fp∗ it is sufficient to show that the capacity constraints
are satisfied. The fact that fp∗j ≥ ⌈p
∗
j⌉ implies that
⌊
fp∗j
⌋
≥ ⌈p∗j⌉, so we just need to
show that, for each item j, at most ⌈p∗j⌉ bidders are assigned to it. To verify this fact,
note that any bidder who is assigned to her parent item does not have child items so,
in x∗, she is spending all of her unit of scrip money on that parent item. In other words,
for any item j, the only bidder that may be assigned to it without having contributed
to an increase of j’s PF price by 1 is the parent bidder of j in the tree; thus, the total
number of bidders is at most ⌈p∗j⌉.
Now, let q and x denote the prices and the assignment computed by the SDM mech-
anism; by Lemma 4.2, since there exists a valid assignment at prices fp∗, this implies
that q ≤ fp∗. The fact that the SDMmechanism assigns each bidder to one of her MBB
items at prices q implies that vi(x) = maxj{vij/qj}. On the other hand, let r be an MBB
item of bidder i at the PF prices p∗. If bidder i had bi units of scrip money to spend on
such MBB items, this would mean that vi(x
∗) = bi(vir/p
∗
r) so, since bi = 1, this implies
7Note that this may not be the only way in which the SDM mechanism can proceed but, since the bidders’
valuations for the final outcome are unique, this is without loss of generality.
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that vi(x
∗) = vir/p
∗
r. Using this inequality along with the fact that qj ≤ fp
∗
j for all
items j, we can show that
vi(x) = max
j
{
vij
qj
}
≥
vir
qr
≥
vir
fp∗r
=
1
f
· vi(x
∗),
which implies that vi(x) ≥ minj{p
∗
j/⌈p
∗
j⌉} · vi(x
∗) for any bidder i.
5. CONNECTIONS TO MECHANISM DESIGN WITH MONEY
In hindsight, a closer look at the mechanisms of this chapter reveals an interesting
connection between our work and known results from the literature on mechanism
design with money. What we show in this section is that one can uncover useful inter-
pretations of money-free mechanisms as mechanisms with actual monetary payments
by instead considering appropriate logarithmic transformations of the bidders’ valua-
tions. In what follows, we expand on this connection for the two mechanisms that we
have proposed.
Partial Allocation Mechanism. We begin by showing that one can actually interpret
the item fractions discarded by the Partial Allocation mechanism as VCG payments.
The valuation of player i for the PA mechanism outcome is vi(x) = fi · vi(x
∗), or
vi(x) =
( ∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x
∗)]bi′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x
∗
−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
· vi(x
∗). (13)
Taking a logarithm on both sides of Equation (13) and then multiplying them by bi
yields
bi log vi(x) = bi log vi(x
∗)−
∑
i′ 6=i
bi′ log vi′(x
∗
−i) −
∑
i′ 6=i
bi′ log vi′(x
∗)
 . (14)
Now, instead of focusing on each bidder i’s objective in terms of maximizing her valua-
tion, we instead consider a logarithmic transformation of that objective. More specifi-
cally, define ui(·) = bi log vi(·) to be bidder i’s surrogate valuation. Since the logarithmic
transformation is an increasing function of vi, for every bidder, her objective amounts
to maximizing the value of this surrogate valuation. Substituting in Equation (14) us-
ing the surrogate valuation for each player gives
ui(x) = ui(x
∗)−
∑
i′ 6=i
ui′(x
∗
−i) −
∑
i′ 6=i
ui′(x
∗)
 .
This shows that the surrogate valuation of a bidder for the output of the PAmechanism
equals her surrogate valuation for the PF allocation minus a “payment” which corre-
sponds to exactly the externalities that the bidder causes with respect to the surrogate
valuations! Note that, in settings where monetary payments are allowed, a VCGmech-
anism first computes an allocation thatmaximizes the social welfare, and then defines
a set of monetary payments such that each bidder’s payment corresponds to the ex-
ternality that her presence causes. The connection between the PA mechanism and
VCG mechanisms is complete if one notices that the PF objective aims to compute an
allocation x maximizing the value of
∑
i bi log vi(x), which is exactly the social welfare∑
i ui(x) with respect to the players’ surrogate valuations. Therefore, the impact that
the fraction being removed from each player’s PF allocation has on that player’s valu-
ation is analogous to that of a VCG payment in the space of surrogate valuations. The
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fact that the PA mechanism is truthful can hence be deduced from the fact the play-
ers wish to maximize their surrogate valuations and the VCG mechanism is truthful
with respect to these valuations. Nevertheless, the fact that the PA mechanism guar-
antees such a strong approximation of the PF solution remains surprising even after
revealing this reduction.
Also note that VCG mechanisms do not, in general, guarantee envy-freeness. The
connection between the PA mechanism and VCG mechanisms that we provide above,
combined with the envy-freeness results that we proved for the PA mechanism for both
additive linear and Leontief valuations, implies that the VCG mechanism is actually
envy-free for settings with money and bidders having the corresponding surrogate val-
uations. Therefore, these results also contribute to the recent work on finding truthful,
envy-free, and efficient mechanisms [Cohen et al. 2011; Feldman and Lai 2012].
Strong Demand Matching Mechanism. We now provide an even less obvious connec-
tion between the SDM mechanism and existing literature on mechanism design with
money; this time we illustrate how one can interpret the SDM mechanism as a sta-
ble matching mechanism. In order to facilitate this connection, we begin by reducing
the problem of computing a valid assignment to the problem of computing a “stable”
matching: we first scale each bidder’s valuations so that her minimum non-zero valua-
tion for an item is equal to n, and then, for each item j we create n copies of that item
such that the k-th copy (where k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}) of item j has a reserve price rjk = k.
Given some price for each item copy, every buyer is seeking to be matched to one copy
with a price that maximizes her valuation to price ratio, i.e. an MBB copy. A match-
ing of each bidder to a distinct item copy in this new problem instance is stable if and
only if every bidder is matched to an MBB copy; it is easy to verify that such a stable
matching will always exist since there are n copies of each item. Note that in a stable
matching any two copies of the same item, each of which is being matched to some
bidder, need to have exactly the same price, otherwise the more expensive copy cannot
be an MBB choice for the bidder matched to it.
Now, a valid assignment of the initial input of the SDM mechanism implies a stable
matching in the new problem instance: set the price pjk of the k-th copy of item j to be
equal to the price pj of item j in the valid assignment, unless this violates its reserve
price, i.e. pjk = max{pj , rjk}, and match each bidder to a distinct copy of the item that
she was assigned to by the valid assignment; the validity of the assignment implies
that, for each item j, the number of bidders assigned to it is at most ⌊pj⌋, and hence
the number of item copies for which pjk ≥ rjk, i.e. pjk = pj is enough to support all these
bidders. Similarly, a stable matching of the item copies implies a valid assignment of
the actual items of the initial problem instance: the price pj of each item j is set to be
equal to the minimum price over all its copies (pj = mink{pjk}), and each bidder who is
matched to one of these copies is allocated a fraction 1/pj of the corresponding actual
item.
Using this reduction, we can now focus on the problem of computing such a stable
matching of each bidder to just one distinct copy of some item; that is, we wish to de-
fine a price pjk ≥ rjk for each one of them ·n item copies, as well as a matching of each
bidder to a distinct copy such that every bidder is matched to one of her MBB copies for
the given prices. If we consider the same surrogate valuations ui(·) = log vi(·), the ob-
jective of each bidder i to be matched to a copy of some item j that maximizes the ratio
vij/pjk is translated to the objective of maximizing the difference log vij − log pjk. If one
therefore replaces the values vij of the valuation vector reported by each bidder i with
the values log vij , then the initial problem is reduced to the problem of computing sta-
ble prices for these transformed valuations, assuming that monetary payments are al-
lowed. This problem has received a lot of attention in the matching literature, building
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upon the assignment model of Shapley and Shubik [Shapley and Shubik 1971]. Hav-
ing revealed this connection, we know that we can truthfully compute a bidder optimal
matching that does not violate the reserve prices using, for example, the mechanism of
Aggarwal et al. [Aggarwal et al. 2009]; one can verify that these are exactly the loga-
rithmic transformations of the prices of the SDM mechanism, and also that this is the
matching the SDM mechanism computes. Note that increasing the surrogate prices
of overdemanded item copies by some additive constant corresponds to increasing the
corresponding actual prices by a multiplicative constant. Therefore, this transforma-
tion also sheds some light on why the SDM mechanism uses multiplicative increases
of the item prices.
6. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
Our work was motivated by the fact that no incentive compatible mechanisms were
known for the natural and widely used fairness concept of Proportional Fairness. In
hindsight, our work provides several new contributions. First, the class of bidder val-
uation functions for which our results apply is surprisingly large and it contains sev-
eral well studied functions; previous truthful mechanisms for fairness were studied for
much more restricted classes of valuation functions. Second, to the best of our knowl-
edge, this is first work that defines and gives guarantees for a strong notion of approx-
imation for fairness, where one desires to approximate the valuation of every bidder.
Finally, our Partial Allocation mechanism can be seen as a framework for designing
truthful mechanisms without money. This mechanism can be generalized further by
restricting the range of the outcomes (similar to maximal-in-range mechanisms when
one can use money). Specifically, the set of feasible outcomes F can be restricted to
any downward closed subset of outcomes; that is, as long as (x
1
, x
2
, ..., xn) ∈ F implies
(f
1
· x
1
, f
2
· x
2
, ..., fn · xn) ∈ F for every set of scalars fi ∈ [0, 1], then the mechanism
remains well defined. We believe that this generalization is a powerful one, and might
allow for new solutions to other mechanism design problems without money.
In terms of open problems, the obvious one is to close the gap between the approx-
imation guarantee of Theorem 3.4 and the inapproximability result of Theorem 3.6.
According to these bounds, when all the bidders have equal bi values, the best possible
approximation guarantee lies somewhere between 0.5 and 0.75 for two-bidder instances
and between 0.368 and 0.5 as the number of bidders goes to infinity.
Possibly the most interesting open problem though is the study of the following nat-
ural objective: instead of aiming to maximize the minimum vi(x)/vi(x
∗) ratio across
every bidder i, one may instead wish to maximize the product of all these ratios. Note
that maximizing this objective is equivalent to maximizing the PF objective
∏
i vi(x).
The Partial Allocation mechanism guarantees a 1/e approximation of the form(∏
i
vi(x)
)1/n
≥
1
e
(∏
i
vi(x
∗)
)1/n
. (15)
On the other hand, the inapproximability result of Theorem 3.6 does not apply to this
objective and hence one might hope to significantly improve the guarantee of Inequal-
ity (15). The way to do this would be to possibly sacrifice the value of some bidders,
something that the objective studied in this paper would not allow, in favor of this
aggregate measure. Alternatively, one could prove stronger inapproximability results
showing that no such truthful mechanism exists.
Finally, a broader question that arises from this work has to do with the power of
“money burning”. Specifically, one can verify that, in dealing with scale-free objectives
such as the one studied in this work and the one proposed above, discarding fractions
of the bidders’ resources allows the mechanism designer to not worry about the ac-
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tual scale of each bidder’s valuations: the assumption of homogeneity is sufficient for
designing truthful mechanisms with non-trivial approximation guarantees. If, on the
other hand, discarding resources were disallowed and the mechanism designer were
restricted to using only monetary payments, then homogeneity would not be sufficient
and the scale of each bidder’s valuations would need to be elicited somehow before the
appropriate payments could be chosen; this significantly complicates the work of the
mechanism designer. It would therefore be very interesting to better understand the
settings for which “money burning” may lead to improved results despite the ineffi-
ciencies that it introduces.
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APPENDIX
A. OMITTED PROOFS
This Appendix includes the proofs that are missing from the main section.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.3. We first prove that this lemma is true for any number k
of pairs when βi = 1 for every pair. For this special case we need to show that, if∑k
i=1 δi ≤ b, then
k∏
i=1
(1 + δi) ≤
(
1 +
b
k
)k
.
Let δ¯i denote the values that actually maximize the left hand side of this inequality
and ∆k′ =
∑k′
i=1 δ¯i denote the sum of these values up to δ¯k′ . Note that it suffices to
show that δ¯i = b/k for all i since we have
k∏
i=1
(1 + δi) ≤
k∏
i=1
(1 + δ¯i),
and replacing δ¯i with b/k yields the inequality that we want to prove.
To prove that δ¯i = b/k we first prove that for any k
′ ≤ k and any i ≤ k′ we get
δ¯i = ∆k′/k
′; we prove this fact by induction on k′: For the basis step (k′ = 2) we show
that δ¯1 = ∆2/2. For any given value of ∆2 we know that any choice of δ1 will yield
2∏
i=1
(1 + δi) = (1 + δ1)(1 + ∆2 − δ1).
Taking the partial derivative with respect to δ1 readily shows that this is maxi-
mized when δ1 = ∆2/2, thus δ¯1 = ∆2/2. For the inductive step we assume that
δ¯i = ∆k′−1/(k
′ − 1) for all i ≤ k′ − 1. This implies that for any given value of ∆k′ ,
given a choice of δk′ the remaining product is maximized if the following holds
k′∏
i=1
(1 + δi) =
(
1 +
∆k′ − δk′
k′ − 1
)k′−1
(1 + δk′).
Once again, taking the partial derivative of this last formula with respect to δk′ for any
given ∆k′ shows that this is maximized when δk′ = ∆k′/k
′. This of course implies that
∆k′−1 =
k′−1
k′ ∆k′ so δ¯i = ∆k′/k
′ for all i ≤ k′.
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This property of the δ¯i that we just proved, along with the fact that ∆k ≤ b implies
k∏
i=1
(1 + δi) ≤
(
1 +
∆k
k
)k
≤
(
1 +
b
k
)k
.
We now use what we proved above in order to prove the lemma for any rational δi
using a proof by contradiction. Assume that there exists a multiset A of pairs (δi, βi)
with βi ≥ 1 and
∑
i βi · δi ≤ b such that∏
i
(1 + δi)
βi >
(
1 +
b
B
)B
, (16)
where B =
∑
i βi. Let M be an arbitrarily large value such that β
′
i = Mβi is a natural
number for all i. Also, let b′ = Mb. Then
∑
i β
′
i · δi ≤ b
′, and B′ = M ·B =
∑
i β
′
i. Raising
both sides of Inequality 16 to the power ofM yields
∏
i
(1 + δi)
β′
i >
(
1 +
b′
B′
)B′
.
To verify that this is a contradiction, we create a multiset to which, for any pair (δi, βi)
of multiset A, we add β′i pairs (δi, 1). This multiset contradicts what we showed above
for the special case of pairs with βi = 1.
Extending the result to real valued δi just requires approximating the δi closely
enough with rational valued terms. Specifically, let δi = δ
′
i + ǫi, where ǫi ≥ 0 and δ
′
i is
rational. Then
∑
i δ
′
iβi ≤ b, and by the result for rational δ,∏
i
(1 + δ′i)
βi ≤
(
1 +
b
B
)B
.
But then ∏
i
(1 + δi)
βi ≤
∏
i
(1 + δ′i + ǫi)
βi
≤
∏
i
[
(1 + δ′i)
(
1 +
ǫi
1 + δ′i
)]βi
≤
(
1 +
b
B
)B∏
i
(
1 +
ǫi
1 + δ′i
)βi
.
Since ǫi can be arbitrarily small, it follows that even for real valued δi∏
i
(1 + δi)
βi ≤
(
1 +
b
B
)B
.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.10. For any given approximate PF allocation x˜, one can
quickly verify that the valuation of bidder i for her final allocation only decreases as
the value of
∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x˜−i)]
b
i′ increases. We can therefore assume that the approxima-
tion factor is minimized when the denominator of Equation (12) takes on its maximum
value, i.e. x˜−i = x
∗
−i. This implies that the fraction in this equation will always be less
ACM Journal Name, Vol. V, No. N, Article A, Publication date: January YYYY.
Mechanism Design for Fair Division A:25
than or equal to 1, and the valuation of bidder i will therefore equal
f˜i · vi(x˜) ≥
( ∏
i′ [vi′(x˜)]
b
i′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x
∗
−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
≥ (1− ǫ)
( ∏
i′ [vi′(x
∗)]bi′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x
∗
−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
= (1− ǫ)fi · vi(x
∗).
The first inequality holds because the right hand side is minimized when x˜−i = x
∗
−i,
and the second inequality holds because x˜ is defined to be an allocation that approxi-
mates x∗. The result follows on using Theorem 3.4 to lower bound fi.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.11. In the proof of the previous lemma we showed that, if bid-
der i is truthful, then her valuation in the final allocation produced by the adapted
PA mechanism will always be at least (1 − ǫ) times the valuation fi · vi(x
∗) that she
would receive if all the PF allocations could be computed optimally rather than approx-
imately. We now show that her valuation cannot be more than (1 − ǫ)−1 times greater
than fi · vi(x
∗), even if she misreports her preferences. Upon proving this statement,
the theorem follows from the fact that, even if bidder i being truthful results in the
worst possible approximation for this bidder, still any lie can increase her valuation by
a factor of at most (1− ǫ)−2.
For any allocation x˜ we know that
∏
i′ [vi′ (x˜)]
b
i′ ≤
∏
i′ [vi′(x
∗)]bi′ , by definition of
PF. Also, any allocation x˜−i that the approximation algorithm may compute instead of
x∗−i will satisfy
∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x˜)]
b
i′ ≥ (1 − ǫ)
∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x
∗)]bi′ . Using Equation (12) we can
thus infer that no matter what the computed allocations x˜ and x˜−i are, bidder i will
experience a valuation of at most( ∏
i′ [vi′ (x˜)]
b
i′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x˜−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
≤
( ∏
i′ [vi′(x
∗)]bi′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′ (x˜−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
≤ (1− ǫ)
( ∏
i′ [vi′ (x
∗)]bi′∏
i′ 6=i [vi′(x
∗
−i)]
b
i′
)1/bi
≤ (1− ǫ) fi · vi(x
∗).
PROOF OF LEMMA 3.12. As the valuation functions are all concave and homoge-
neous of degree one, so is the following product,(∏
i
[vi(x)]
bi
)1/B
.
Also, note that this product has the same optima as the PF objective. Consequently
the above optimization is an instance of convex programming with linear constraints,
which can be solved approximately in polynomial time. More precisely, an approxima-
tion with an additive error of ǫ to the optimal product of the valuations can be found
in time polynomial in the problem instance size and log(1/ǫ) [Nemirovski 2006]. In
addition, the approximation is a feasible allocation.
We normalize the individual valuations to have a value 1 for an allocation of every-
thing. If B =
∑
i bi is the sum of the bidders’ weights then, at the optimum, bidder i
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has valuation at least bi/B. To verify that this is true, just note that the sum of the
prices of all goods in the competitive equilibrium will be B and bidder i will have a
budget of bi. Since each bidder will spend all her budget on the items she values the
most for the prices at hand, her valuation for her bundle will have to be at least bi/B.
This implies that the optimum product valuation is at least
∏
i(bi/B)
bi/B ≥ mini bi/B;
this can be approximated to within an additive factor ǫ ·mini bi/B in time polynomial in
log 1/ǫ+logB, and this is an approximation to within a multiplicative factor of 1−ǫ.
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